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I recommend starting this book with an open mind, as Bregman departs from a lot of the older left-right divides. He hopes to cast our vision to a far horizon and try to get us thinking about things in a new light, according to what humankind's progress so far might allow for in the future. He assesses that despite the relative prosperity of a great deal of the world's population (and he gives a slew of figures to illustrate that), we maybe don't find a lot of meaning to our lives and require a new inspiration to animate us. While venturing into the topic of utopia, Bregman recognizes that real utopian ideas tend to lend themselves toward fanaticism, intolerance, violence, etc., so he aims merely to provide a looser vision that the typical more detailed utopian ideal.
The first part of Bregman's utopian vision is free money. That is, a universal basic income (UBI). He makes a very compelling-sounding case for it, citing all manner of examples and studies. However, a close inspection of these reveal that most of them are means-tested, that is, aimed at only the poor, and therefore they are not "universal." This leaves it to question if everyone received a certain amount (let's say $3,000 per month), would not everyone's expectations and expenditures merely rise to that level, such that those without additional income would seem almost no better off than those without UBI today? Remember that Bregman, after insisting that even "poor" people in the West are well-off compared to wealthy people in the recent past or many people in less developed countries today, are still "poor" because the envy they have for those even richer than themselves and this causes significant anxiety for them--"it's all about relative poverty" (emphasis in original, p 65). Additionally, Bregman gives the impression of cherry-picking his evidence. For instance, he cites the example of 13 homeless people who received free money in England and how much they prospered. But how many of the homeless suffer from significant mental illness, and how might that affect a broader program? We don't learn from Bregman because he offers no evidence in this area.
Certainly a simple UBI program would be less obnoxious and less expensive than a highly structured, regulated, well-staffed entitlement program with copious oversight. Restricting a basic income to only a means-tested basic income (not for all, but for the poor/needy), would undo some of the benefits of UBI's simplicity, but might help prevent the benefits being lost in the wash of money thrown at society, and also not involve giving away as much. Bregman does not really tackle the moral issue raised by Murray Rothbard, Robert Nozick, and the like--based on what argument may one person seize goods one person has worked for by force and just give them to another who has not? His arguments are chiefly pragmatic, and since Bregman here (and elsewhere) cherry picks and sometimes outright misrepresents his evidence, the reader is advised toward a bit of skepticism on the purely results-oriented elements.
To focus a bit on that last point, Bregman claims to quote Frédéric Bastiat's tract about what is seen and what is unseen (the famous broken window story). While he starts the story accurately, he ends it by claiming Bastiat says what is unseen is "community service, clean air, free refills on the house." (p 103) In fact, Bastiat blew up the whole idea of consumerism that all of Bregman's economic arguments are premised on, that the development of capital is more important than spending for spending's sake. Which is precisely why we're not better off by bombing New York City every other year and rebuilding it, because what is not seen are the resources required to rebuild, while appearing to "stimulate" some aspects of the economy, are coming from other areas that would have been stimulated instead, and, at the end of the day, despite all that apparent "stimulation," we're only as well off as we were in the beginning, whereas had those resources gone to something new, we would have had what we already had plus something new besides. Which is why Liberty is the only philosophy to embrace peace as a means toward greater prosperity.
Bregman goes on from UBI toward a shorter work week, specifically, a 15-hour week. He actually alleges that "medieval people were probably closer to achieving the contended idleness of the Land of Plenty than we are today." (p 138). Of course they were, and it's precisely why their lives were so primitive and short, as well, a fact Bregman documents in his first chapter. Bregman makes it sound like everyone is eager to work less, citing (selectively) study after study and survey after survey. Yet, in the end, he calls for a recourse to government violence to enforce his idea, "There is hardly a politician around still willing to endorse it." (p 146) Prosperous people are certainly under no obligation to work 40 or more hours a week if they don't wish to, and I know some who don't. But that so many do--why did Bill Gates keep going to work day after day for so long?--is stronger testimony than any studies or surveys Bregman might cite. And if the idea of a 15-hour work week is so terrific, why do we have to point the government's gun at everyone's head to enforce it?
More practically, think about what such a law would do. Bregman is a writer. So that means he would not only be forbidden from writing for more than 15 hours a week, but he could not think about his writing, do research for his writing, talk about his writing, meet with readers, sell his product, for more than 15 hours a week, combining all those tasks. How would we enforce it? With a Harrison Bergeron-style buzzer interrupting Bregman's thoughts for all but 15 hours a week? Bregman is correct that we could probably live as good a life as we presently do on quite a bit less work every week. But we would be treading water. Forget about a COVID-19 vaccine, a cure for cancer or AIDS or the common cold, flying cars, reduced pollution, improved agricultural methods, etc. Forget about progress. And if people are so stressed out from just relative inequality, even if they are far from absolute poverty, they will become more stressed when they realize they are prohibited from hustling to improve their position.
Bregman also takes aim at "bullshit" jobs, many of which are jobs he just doesn't understand in terms of value-added. Why did people line up to bail out banks with their hard-earned incomes back in 2008 if nobody needs a bank and they don't add value? One of the "facts" Bregman cites to prove his contention against the financial sector is that "For every dollar a bank earns, an estimated equivalent of 60 cents is destroyed elsewhere in the economic chain." (p 169) This doesn't even pass the third-grader test. Given both the volume of dollars that pass through banks and the frequency with which they do, if this were true, we'd be living in the Stone Age already. I would agree with Bregman that there are a number of people who individually feel their jobs are bullshit, and I would take those individuals at their word. No doubt such things exist (I've seen some too), but much of what Bregman lumps into that category merely reveals his own ignorance about what some people do.
Bregman suggests open borders. I will try not to tell him that puts him in the camp of real Liberals like that sneaky Friedrich Hayek (no, not anti-Liberal "liberal" Progressives, but real Liberals in favor of Freedom and Liberty). He cites the many benefits of doing so. While some of his figures might be suspect (especially since he has shown elsewhere a mighty flexibility in both picking and quoting facts), in fact it is hard to argue that open borders do anything but benefit everyone on the net. However, if combined with other things like raising taxes and providing free handouts, those with the goods would leave the high-tax areas, and those without would flock to them, so it turns out Liberty is pretty much a package deal. All of it (or at least most of it) or the pieces Bregman would cafeteria-style select might well undo to more Statist elements selected.
Speaking of Liberalism, Bregman tries to crucify it, especially by citing economic crises. He completely ignores the amount and level of government intervention in each of them, as well as the contribution to economic trouble made by well-meaning interventions after the fact. For instance, he cites the 2008 crisis and says "one free-market dogma after another crashed and burned." (p 241) He should try reading Dick Morris' predictions prior to the crisis describing the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in creating the housing crisis and predicting its outcome (accurately). The fact that Bregman's own first chapter is pretty much a vindication of the practical benefits of Freedom, he is really only left with complaining that Freedom does not leave anyone feeling fulfilled and motivated (I would agree), and its natural outcomes (such as income inequality) leave people feeling anxious, no matter how much better off they are even being at the bottom of a rising pile. Maybe try reading Jonah Goldberg's Suicide of the West: How the Rebirth of Tribalism, Populism, Nationalism, and Identity Politics Is Destroying American Democracy for a different take on both the reasons for today's malaise and what to do about it.
Make no mistake, Bregman identifies real problems in the world today. His writing style is fluid and entertaining, he makes his subject accessible to all. Some of his observations and even one-liners are as penetrating as they are entertaining. He turns out to sometimes be a little too glib, on close inspection... So when it comes time for real solutions, I would keep looking, but anyway, the book is worth reading.