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An interesting presentation about a very busy time, but in a corner of the world a lot of Americans haven’t focused on all that much, not at the time, nor since. Larry Devlin was the CIA’s Chief of Station in newly-independent Congo, doing his best to hold up the American end during a crucial part of the Cold War. Much of it reads boldly and breathlessly, almost like a Western. One assumes Devlin is being at least a bit self-serving, as are most memoir-writers, but it is both entertaining and informative nonetheless.
I suspect Devlin was able to get so much of this story out in public not only because of its age, but because the countless hearings that covered some of the more significant issues Devlin recounts. He maintains his innocence in terms of later accusations as to his involvement in assassinations and coups, and claims that “I told ya so” on a couple of occasions where it seemed like maybe he was more just hedging his bets at the time.
Unfortunately, the last third of the book gets a little jumpy and patchy, with Devlin sometimes dropping a narrative when it seems unfinished, then jumping into another one with no transition. Maybe that was the pre-publication review board’s black Sharpie “highlighter” at work? Maybe his editor just got tired or sloppy toward the end? Even still, there are some interesting nuggets in there too.
Devlin may seem to apologize a bit too much for some of his authoritarian friends in the Congo. I totally understand where he was coming from, fighting the Cold War against the Soviets, trying to prevent more of the world from falling behind the Iron Curtain of totalitarianism and poverty, not to mention trying to prevent the Cold War from going hot. So the bad people who support the U.S. are at least better than the bad people who support the other side. But we don’t have to make excuses for them beyond that, do we? Unless, of course, our consciences are too delicate for the reality as it was.
As he said in his own words:
While Washington did not want a coup, there was little it could do once Mobutu had taken over. In a profound sense, the Cold War played into his hands. The United States could not afford to withdraw its support for him because, if it did, the still restive Soviet-backed rebels in Stanleyville would surely have taken over the country…Washington wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling the Congo and thus had to work with whomever was in power and could keep the Soviets’ surrogates at bay. (p 236)
Devlin’s account of the other side at least did not tend to overestimate them:
Shortly after the Congo became independent, Moscow announced that it was sending food for the “poor, hungry, oppressed workers and peasants” of the Congo. Sure enough, a Soviet ship arrived at Matadi, the Congo’s primary seaport. It was full of wheat. Unfortunately, the Congo did not possess a flour mill, so it had to be loaded on a ship once more and sent elsewhere to be milled. The episode did not match Moscow’s fraternal dispatch of snowplows to tropical Guinea two years earlier but it made clear that our Cold War adversaries were not ten feet tall. (p 26)
It really was another world then. Devlin describes not only the Embassy opening itself up to be a flophouse for American refugees, but Embassy officers opening up their homes as well. In today’s world, every Embassy and Consulate is a fortress unto itself, and American citizens are shown no greater hospitality than local nationals.
For those wishing for a peek into the clandestine world, Devlin offers a surprisingly frank glimpse, though one assumes even he left out some of the really good parts. For those with an interest in the Cold War or in the history of Africa, this certainly fills an important place and is well worth reading. Anyway, it’s pretty fun reading for much of it and it isn’t some dry history book from high school, so you could even take it to the beach with you. Definitely a good read, but not a must-read.